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COMPARATIVE CYCLICALBEHAVIOR OF
CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNTRATES
Section 1. Domestic and Foreign Factors
(I) In this chapter we examine the cyclicalbehavior of the cen-
tral bank, or ocial, discount rates in four countries.From the out.
set this must be understood: centralbank rates are not primarily
products of market activities. They are the result of deliberate
action on the part of the central banks,frequently called for by
statute and law in particular situations. Thebank may, for ex-
ample, be obliged to keep a certain minimum reserve against its
liabilities. The actions may however occur long before these or other
critical points have been reached. They may then be the product
of the belief on the part of the central bank authorities that changes
in the discount rate are appropriate as to timing and extent in order
to avoid such critical points.
Some of the reasons for a variation of the rate would also apply
under strictly commercial conditions, but in central bank policy
they are submerged among other, wider aims of general economic
policy. Sometimes these anus involved stabilization of the general
price level, or of a particular group of prices. Sometimes movements
of prices in definite directions were intended. There is thus little,
if anything, automatic about the moves made by central banks; they
belong to a different kind of game. This does not in the least mean
that there are no compelling reasons for making certain moves. But
countries differ as to ideas, purposes, and objectives of policy, and
the means of realizing them differ too, although all countries may
be on the gold standard.
Another important differentium skcljicum is the international
implication of each decision to change the discount rate. It would
be most important to learn on what occasions the central banks
changed the discount rate for domestic and when for foreign rea-
sons. It is dicult to form even an expectation as to whether the
domestic or the foreign influences should dominate, or to state un-
ambiguously whether one or the other prevails. Information about
these factors is exceedingly hard to come by. In this respect Table
80 is a unique exception, inasmuch as the Reiclisbank itself at-VARIABLES OF CENTRAL BANK POLICY
tempted to state whether increases in its rate were due toexternal
or internal causes.Table 81 lists the occasions when the Rcichsbank
indicated why the discount rate was raised for external reasons.
Discount policy is thus one of the central factorsaimed at influenc-
ing international financial transactions.
Besides this, there is the expected effect upon the domesticinter-
est rates. To what extent they areaffected by changes in bank rate
could be answered only for each countryseparately, because na-
tional financial structure can and does varyconsiderably within the
common framework of thegold standard. Some discussion of this
point is included here, though an extensiveinvestigation is entirely
outside the scope of this work. When a paperstandard prevails an
interdependency of bank rate and the other interest ratesexists too,
but it is presumably of a still less transparentnature.
Section 2. The Incompleteness of Information
(2) Before proceeding, our position mustbe stated more fully.
To begin with, the chief interestis in the comparative cyclicalbe-
havior of central bank rates. This isonly one of many important
aspects of these rates. The greatcomplexity of the field of central
bank operations can hardly berevealed in this study. We do not
attempt in particular a historyof discount policy; several important
works exist on this topic,' althoughthe last word has probably not
yet been said. But it isdoubtful how fundamental progress can
ever be made in viewof the great lack of importantdata. Central
bank policy historically has been afield of bigotry, of mutilated
evidence, of confused ideals ofpolicy often changed from oneshort
period to another, of whitewashingthe institution and of lip service
to a dimly recognizedcommunity of interest with thecentral banks
in other countries. On theother hand there is no doubtthat many
data are "authentic" and preciseasfar as they go; and weshall
see that they do not goat all far, becausethere always existed
many other activitiesof these banks about which verylittle is known
but that add up to a greatiniluence upon the moneymarket.
Thus even the most detailedknowledge of discount rates isonly
half the story.
'Cf. R. C. H. Hawtrey, ACentury of Bank Rate,London, 1938; Elmer
Wood, English Theorics ofCentral Banking Control,1819-1858, Cambridge,
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5.5 6.5'VARIABLES OF CENTRAL BANK POLiCY
Section 3. The Fourteen Variables ofCentral Bank Policy
(3) Discount rates are only oneof many instruments used by the
central banks. Yet this is almost theonly one for which informa-
tionnot at all completeinformationtis available. This limitation
applies not only to the presentstudy but also constitutes an implicit
criticism of many others inthis field which have been consultedfor
the present purposes.
In using short-term rates, it waspointed out how important it was
to use effective rates, or asfar as exchange rates wereconcerned, to
avoid "posted" rates so thatthe measurements would actuallyrefer
to prices at which alarge and if possible predominantvolume of
transactions occurred. The sameprinciple must prevail elsewhere.
If there are several prices, rates, orother factors, a convenient repre-
sentation in one numbercould only be achieved by meansof a
weighted index. We now inquire intothis possibility.
In order to obtain acomprehensive picture of thesituation,
Table 82 gives a reasonablycomplete list of instruments ofpolicy.
Three classes are distinguished,chiefly domestic or chieflyforeign
or externaland bothmeaning that therespective instruments in
each class are working, orintended to work, in theindicated direc-
tions. A classificationof the stimuli from domestic orforeign sources
which set the various instrumentsin operation may or maynot
coincide with that of Table82. Those entriesprinted in italics
seem to be thegenerally and continually mostimportant ones.
The attempted classification maybe questioned. We havetried
to meet possiblecriticism by statingthat the variables belong
chiefly, but not exclusively, intheir respective classes.
These signify two things,not necessarilyconnected. First, the
reason for a changein one of the variables stemslargely from either
internal (domestic) orexternal (foreign) economicforces. A rise
of the domestic pricelevel or great stock marketactivity are of the
first kind; loss ofgold to other countries, orchanges in the foreign
trade balance whencaused by a drop in exportsdue to foreign
competition abroad, areof the second kind.Second, the central
banks, having beeninduced by such variations toalter their course,
expect through therespective variable toaffect in a given waythe
domestic or foreign activityshowing an undesirabletendency.
The argument that someof the forces areentirely negligible even
when used, in comparisonwith others enumerated,is only partly
367
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TABLE 82
List of Instruments of Central Bank Policy
368
I Chiefly domestic: (1) Open market policy
"Private" rates, i.e., disc'riniinato.yrates of djs. count below or above the officialrate
Subsidiary rates,e.g., "lombard" rates,
ad- vances" rate, etc.
Quantitative regulation ofamounts of bills dis. counted
Type of bills admitted, especially
regarding ma. turity; imposition of length of loan
Tie-in of (liScOuflts and discountrate with in- terest rates at open market,e.g., by custom or law
Regulation of minimum balancesor resc'es re-
quired of commercial banksat central bank
Moral pressure uponcommercial banks, brokers,
etc.
II Chiefly foreign (9) Premium on gold sales andpurchases
Administrative means (other than9) for atfract.
ing and repelling specie, includingsterilization of gold
Foreign exchange bills boughtand sold'
Forward operations in foreignexchange
Cooperation (by negotiation,treaty, or through
international bank) with othercentral banks HI Domestic & foreign(14) Discount rate
'This applies mostly for thepostwar period. This is not alwaysan Instrument of policy but, as gold oftenbecomes, an object of policy.
valid. This opinionwould have to dependto a large degree upon
precise information, whichis not available. Roughguesses as to the more important can be made;we have accepted this possibility by placing the asteriskopposite three instruments.In that respectwe may even find disagreementregarding the gold premium policy,
and a decision is hardto make in view of themutilated evidence. For somecountries it is noteven known whether, for considerable periods, sonic of theseprimary instruments ofpolicy were used at all! An excellentillustration is providedby the Bank of England, which foryears engaged in "borrowingon consols." There is no complete agreementabout the techniquesused, the amounts in- volved, and theperiods when theoperations were carried out. Yet there isreason to believe that theBank of England considered them as important corollariesto its discountrate. In other cases there are outright denialsby oflicials thatsome techniques were everSEASONAL VARIATiONS
used, while there is fair evidence from other sources to the con-
trary.
Section 4. Seasonal Variations
(4) In general we have restricted discussions of seasonal varia-
tions and the techniques of their computation andelimination,2 in
order to safeguard this study from further complicationand from
the consequent inability to treat this subject on thelevel that it
requires. But in the present case seasonalchange is closely asso-
ciated with central bank policy (and with exchangerates) and
some of the pioneerwork in devising statistical procedures occurred
here, e.g., E. W. Kemmerer, R. Bachi, andothers (cf. footnote 5).
The interrelation among the seasonalindexes of various activi-
ties in the same country seems tohave been very close and a strong
factor determining discount rate policy. Inthis sense seasonal
market events, e.g., the importation offood and raw materials into
England in the fall, "force" the Bankof England correspondingly
to raise its rate. It is difficult to seethat the bank meant this to be
a policy at all,3 sincethe seasonal nature of the deteriorationof its
reserve ratio was asobvious as any other trivial seasonal occurrence.
No merchant ever had anydoubt as to the seasonal characterof
many of his activities. As a consequencethe planning of his busi-
ness made allowancefor this by embracing a periodof at least a
whole year. At any rate it is impossible tobelieve that the central
bank cannot suppress seasonal variations,if it is strong enough
to suppress cyclicalvariations! In that respect the followingdis-
tinction has to be made: (a)control of the seasonal (cyclical) varia-
tions of the bank's own activities,and (b) control of seasonal
(cyclical) variations outside thebank. The main interest andchief
difficulty lies of course with (b).
The situation becomes howeverstill more involved. An impres-
sion that seasonal variations areinterdependent is gained from
Charts 45 and 46 showing discountrate, legal reserve ratio,total
exports, and total importsfor Great Britain andGermany re-
spectively. There were no seasonalvariations in the Frenchdiscount
rate, although they occur inthe open market rate.All statistics cover
only the pre-World-War-Iperiod. Seasonals incentral bank data
'Cf. Chapter III, section 3, pages82 if.
In some instances the tie-up ofdiscount rate variation withothers is the
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CHART 45
Seasonal Indexes of Discount Rate, Reserve Ratio, Totalexports
and Imports, Prewar, 1876-1914
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were nowhere observed after1925. This jin itself remarkable, since
most other activities that hadshown them before 1914retained them; but they disappearedin most of the financial field.The two charts show clearlyvery good positiveor negative correlations. They also containsome surprising inconsistenciesthat would de- serve closer study thancan be undertaken here.
A further importantinterre1ationsJip holdsacross the borders of countries. The seasonalvariations in this field in NewYork and London are intimatelylinked to each other,ass'as fully recog- nized in practice andby many writers.Most noteworthy of theSEASONAL VARIATIONS
CHART 46
Seasonal Indexes of Discount Rate, Reserve Ratio, Total Exports
and Imports, Prewar, 1876-1914
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latter is E. W. Kemmerer,4 from whosework we quote the follow-
ing:
By August net gold movements aretransformed from exports to imports
and the months of September, October andNovember are normally months
of heavy imports of gold, the heaviestbeing in October. The low rates
during the latter part of this period are of coursedue to the large quanti-
ties of bills offered which are drawn against ourgreat cereal and cotton
exports. June, July, and August arethe months of smallest merchandise ex-
4E. W. Kemmerer, Seasonal Variat ionsin Demand forCurrency and Capital




























CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
ports. Imports are low in July, August, and September, andvariable in the
last three monthsofthe year, tending to be high during thosemonths in
recent years. The exports, however, so much exceed the importsin the fall
and early winter, that exchange falls to the lowestpoint of the year about
October, and gold moves in large quantities to the UnitedStates.
These fall months are the months of what iscommonly knownas the
"autumnal pressure" or "autumnal drain" in the Londonmoney market.
They are months of heavy demand for cash forcrop moving purposes in
England, on the Continent, and inmany of the British Colonies, andin
agricultural countries elsewhere. From Julyto November both the bank
rate of discount and the market rate normally rise, whileOctober is the
month of lowest reserves in the Bank ofEngland during theyear.
From the first partofOctober until the latter part of Novemberthe rela-
tive demand for money in the UnitedStates declines somewhat,although
continuing comparatively high, and from thattime on until the end of the
year it fluctuates considerably, increasing somewhatjust prior to the time of Januaiy 1 settlements (op.cit., page 146).
Kemmerer furthermore founda noticeable parallelism between
the seasonal variations ofthe Paris exchange and theLondon ex- change. The Berlin exchangeis even more dominated by thesterling exchange than is the French.
Writing of Great Britain,G. Clare also pointedout this inter-
dependence. We give two salientremarks:
It is seen that in thespring our commercial and bankingtransactions with the restofthe world leavea balance in our favor, which isremitted to us in gold, hut that, in theautumn, when we are paying forour share of the world's harvest, thebalance turns againstus, and the gold ebbs away (op. cit., page 70).
And from the 3rd(revised) edition (London,1981):
It will be observed thatthe claims of the UnitedStates on us (Crest Britain) beingprincipally for agriculturalproduce, must fall mainlyin the autumn and early wintermonths, but thatour counterclaims being such as appertain to no oneseason of the year in particular,are presumably distributed Pretty evenlyover the whole twelve months;and it will be found, as aconsequence, that on aneverage of years the exchange from August to December isagainst us, but during theother months is inour favour. Anexport of gold from thissidejf it is to takeplace at allmay generally be expectedabout the end of theharvest season (pages191- 192).
Many otherwriters might bementioned. (5) Thecorrelation betweenthe four seriesoccurs for both C. Clare, A MoneyMarket Primer, 2nded., London, 1923.
372SEASONAL VARiATIONS
countries, but is more pronounced for Creat Britain. Therewe find
a correspondence among a seasonal rise in the discount rate,a
falling reserve ratio, and rising imports; all thisoccurs in the sec-
ond half of the year. The regularity is astonishing,even when the
shapes of the curves undergo amplitude changes.The fourth series
stays somewhat apart, since the rise of exports in theautumn is
apparently not high enough to offset thepressure upon the ex-
changes caused by the increased imports. But it is alsopossible
indeed likelythat the former carry credit provisoswhile the lat-
ter are against cash. The amplitude of the curve for thereserve ratio
is remarkable at the December trough;up to 1890 it was consid-
erable, it decreased up to 1900, and from 1902on it became really
large. In this latter period the amplitude of the imports alsoin-
creased. Yet from 1897-1909 the amplitude of the seasonal discount
rate changes diminished.6
All this is so far of minor importance; the real difficulty liesin
the disappearance of any seasonal variation of the bankrate in the
period 1894-1896. During these years the other movementsre-
mained almost completely unchanged. Therewere other interrup-
tions too in 1876, 1879-1880, and 1883, and the same observation
holds for the other series. A correlation that holds whetheror not
one serieshere the discount rateis included can hardly be of
much value, unless it could be shown that during the periodsmen-
tioned events on another plane, i.e., cyclical or random fluctuations,
occurred which made seasonal movements unnecessary. These
events, if they occurred at all, must have been quantitatively dif-
ferent from what they otherwise were in those years when the high
correlation on the seasonal level was observed. It would lead too
far to go into this matter at length but it is clear that avery com-
plex situation of interaction of one level of covariation with others
is given while at the same time we are still groping for an under-
standing of relationships in the absence of such complications.
Actually, if the Bank of England discount rate series itself is con-
sidered, some information may be gleaned from its behavior, al-
though the interaction of various levels cannot be so simply ascer-
tained. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that in 1876 the rate
stood for the last seven months at 2 per cent, after a fall from 5 per
cent; a specific cycle trough is set for December 1876. There was an
'Reference is due to the shape of the seasonal trend of the internal demand
for gold, which in an over-all sense moves counter to that of the discount rate.
This is unexpected but must be linked to the seasonal variations of gold move-
me.ds over the frontier and to the quantities involved in all cases.
373S
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even larger drop of the rate in 1879, followed by six monthsat 2
per cent. Iii 1880 however, the rate did not reach 2 per centagain,
nor in 1883. During the thirty-six months of 1894-1896 therate was
thirty consecutive months at 2 per cent; thiswas of course the
well-known period of easy money in London witha specific cycle
trough put in August 1896. In the majority ofcases therefore cheap
money conditions prevailed. The rate touched 2 per centat other
occasions, but too briefly to eliminate seasonal variations.So there
is some support for the notion that largequantitative changesare
a likely connecting link between the various levels ofinterdepend..
ence distinguished.
The chart for Germany requires onlymentioning, since thesame
situation prevails there, hut toa minor extent. Even before 1892,
when the foreign trade figuresstart, the discount rate showedno
seasonal, 1883-.1897; thereserve ratio had an unbroken record with
a clear tendency for the seasonals to increase. Theseasonal varia-
tions of the Reichsbank rateon the other hand tended to become
smaller in two or three steps and finallydisappeared at the end of
1912 (in Great Britain they becamelarger from 1909 onward).The
foreign trade variationsare smaller than in England. The paradox
to the extent that it is onejsminor in this case.
To conclude these remarkswe make these observations:
The individual series have,like most seasonal indexes,great stability overmany years.
There occur abrupt ratherthan gradual changes. Whenone of these series is stronglyaffected by policy, that for'vhatever rea-
sons repeats or creates a seasonalmovement, the abruptnesscan be
explained as a change in policy.If it is not sucha series, an ex-
planation is more difficultto find.
Section 5.Frequency Distrib,,fio,and Cycles of
DiscountRates
(6) We consider thefrequency distributionsfirst. They are made from seasonallyuncorrected data; the Frenchcontain no sea- sonal variations and forthe rest we know howlittle difference, for this purpose,seasonal variations make.The distributionsare shown in Tables 83 and 84 forprewar and postwar.7
Ordering them for thepre-'sVorld-WarI case accordingto the
Cf. Tables 9 and 10 forthose of the openmarket rates. The differentials are analyzed below in section6.
374TABLE 83
Frequency Distribution of Central Bank Discount Rates,
January 1876-July 1914, Seasonally Uncorrected Data






Class Frequency ClassFrequency ClassFrequency
2.00-2.09 71 2.0 70 3.0 89
2.10-2.19 5 2.1 1 3.1 3
2.20-2.29 2 2.2 1 3.2 4
2.30-2.39 3 2.3 1 3.3 3
2.40-2.49 1 2.4 1 3.4 1
2.50-2.59 43 2.5 40 3.5 17
2.60-2.69 11 2.6 1 3.6 5
2.70-2.79 8 2.7 1 3.7 6
2.80-2.89 5 2.8 2 3.8 8
2.90-2.99 10 2.9 3.9 4
3.00-3.09 89 3.0 267 4.0 143
3.10-8.19 9 3.1 2 4.1 8
3.20-3.29 6 3.2 3 4.2 9
3.30-3.39 6 3.3 2 4.3 5
3.40-3.49 8 3.4 2 4.4 4
8.50-3.59 12 3.5 33 4.5 21
3.60-3.69 8 3.6 2 4.6 5
3.70-3.79 5 3.7 4.7 11
3.80-3.89 10 3.8 1 4.8 4
3.90-3.99 6 3.9 2 4.9 7
4.00-4.09 62 4.0 23 5.0 47
4.10-4.19 2 4.1 1 5.1
4.20-4.29 4 4.2 5.2 3
4.30-4.39 2 4.3 5.3 1
4.40-4.49 5 4.4 1 5.4 5
4.50-4.59 12 4.5 2 5.5 17
4.60-4.69 4 4.6 5.6 5
4.70-4.79 2 4.7 5.7 1
4.80-4.89 3 4.8 5.8 1
4.90-4.99 6 4.9 1 5.9 3





5.50-5.59 2 6.5 1
5.60-5.69 2 6.6
5.70-5.79 1 6.7 1
5.80-5.89 1 8.8 1
5.90-5.99 7.3 1
6.00-6.09 4 7.5 1
6.70-6.79 1
7.00-7.09 1 -













Frequency Distribution of Central Bank DiscountRates, January1925..


































































































































































































FREQUENCY DISTRiBUTIONS AND CYCLES
magnitude of the means they are as follows: for theBank of Eng-
land the arithmetic mean is 3.36 per cent, themedian 3.08 per cent;
these values lie between those for France, which are2.92 per cent
and 3.0 per cent, and those for Germany,which are 4.17 per cent
and 4 per cent. This reproduces the order forthe open market rates
in the same countries. For the postwar case,the Bank of England
rate has a mean of 3.39 per centand a median of 3.02 per cent-a
trifling change. But the French rate is nowhigher with 3.68 per cent
and 3.09 per cent respectively and the Cennan goes upto 5.53 per
cent and 5.01 per centrespectively. To this must be added the New
York rate, which yields 2.76 per centand 2.53 per cent. A great deal
of monetary history is told in theshift of position of these figures.
Table 85 summarizes the data for discount rates, aswell as com-
paring them with the openmarket rates. It will be noted that the
discount rate averages higherthan the open market rate (except
for New York, 1925-1938), withBerlin showing the greatest spread
before 1914, and London in1925-1938. On the other hand the
stability of the discount rates wasgreater, as evidenced by the
coefficient of variation. Both ratesshowed greater instability after
1914.
The further description of thefrequency distributions by the
usual measures encounters seriousdifficulties, as a glance at Chart
TABLE 85
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European Central Bank Discount Rates, Prewar
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47 will tell. It I1)('CVOII 1)0(1O111)ted vhcther the formation and the
use of the various averages given above is perInissil)lc, but they(10
at least give some idea that cannot otherwisebe cxpresse(1 vividl.
These distributionsare very unusual and though theSt(an
deviation, coefficient of variation,and the measure of skewness
have been computed, they shallnot be discussed here any further.
The main difficultycomes from the lack of concentration which is
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so marked that one cannot even speak of bimodality or multi-
modality, especially, in view of data which are in the narrow, tech-
nical sense undoubtedly homogeneous. Common to all is the tre-
mendous peak on or near the very top of the distributions. Nowhere
is it as marked as in the case of the French rate. This is simply the
expression of the well-known fact that the French discount rate
was far more stable than those of any other country. This was
brought about by the definitehistorically famousintention of
the Bank of France, as expressed in many statements,8 to keep it as
stable as possible. This programgoing back to the founder of the
bank, Napoleonwas so successfully carried out that the French
rate stayed unchanged at 3 per centduring our periodfrom
June 1900 to February 1907. In the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury there were even much longer periods of complete stability, but
the international transactions were then on a much smaller scale.
This stability is the more remarkable as the Bank of France dealt
directly with the public and would therefore be exposed without
aiiy cushioning, as was the Bank of England, to the varyingneeds
and moods of the money market. This suggests strongly the corn-
plementation of discount policy by other means, as indeed was the
case. Prominent among them and of most directinternational sig-
nificance was the gold premium.
The frequency distributions are so interesting that further manip-
ulations are suggested. They are after all intended to supply in-
formation about structural, static properties of our data that do not
reveal themselves easily, nor from the study of the time series
alone. In Table 86 and Chart 48 we show the following: theFrench
data being by far the most remarkable have been split into two sets
covering 1876-1894 and 1895-1914, i.e., 225 and 235months each.
For each of these two periods frequency distributions weremade in
order to determine whether there existed perhaps asystematic
change in the nature of the data to which the peculiarityof the
distribution i-night have to be attributed. As it turns out,the
measures for the two newdistributions are almost in perfect agree-
ment with each other. The standarddeviations and coefficients of
variation (for whatever they may beworth in this case) and the
medians are identical and the others vary onlyslightly.
8For example, "The size of our reserves allows us tocontemplate without
emotion important variations of our metallicstock, and we only exceptionally
have recourse to a measure [i.e., an increase inthe rate, 0. M.l which is al-
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TABLE 86
Frequency Distribution of Bank ofFrance OfficialDiscount Rates, Prewar, Two Periods, SeasonallyUncorrected Data
January 1876-. January 1895...












3.0 128 141 3.1 2
3.2 1 2 3.3
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1 1 3.5 10 23 3.6 2 3.7
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTiONS AND CYCLES
CHART 48
European Central Bank Discount Rates,Prewar
Frequency Dietrbution, Bank of France,1876-1894 and 1895-1914
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Each of our originaldistributions of Tables83 and84 . sists really of several. Itis however, nota case of simplehetcr. geneity of the data. Eachdistribution may beviewedas CO11pOSL. of three distributionsin the followingmanner:
Distribution i isan ordinary L-shape, IIIis nearlynormal, witit 11a modified U shapethelink betweenthem. Thistype ofCom- position was originallydescribed by Lexisand isnow familiarin population studies whereit describes mortalityincidence (atleast when there stillis high infant mortality).Applied todiscountrates, it means that thelower rates at whichthere issome equilibrium with the generallevel of interestrates of thecountry arethose normally encountered.These are therates where thecentral banks think they belong;this is particularlyevident forFrance. Thedis- tribution markedin on Chart 47 describesin the variousinstances those rates usuallyrelied uponin times ofacute crises. The transitionfrom one to theother can bevery abrupt, butit shows how gradual(or not) itis. We shallnot investigatehow "normal" distributionIII actually is,but even inthe presentstate it is stronglyreminiscent of thattype.'° At leastit expressesfor each central banka preference ofone "crisis rate"over others. Table83 will show thisquite distinctly.In accord withtheaverage levels of interest and discountrates these crisisrates differ fromone country to another. Adistinction isto be maderegarding theheight of the crisis rate andthe crisischange of therate at whateverlevel; e.g., in London thecritical changewas always consideredto be 1 and 1.5 per cent,the first calleda "Coschen" change,the seconda crisis change.
We recall thediscussion ofChapter I,section 5 aboutthe search forcycles and thedifferentways to lookupon economic periods. It iseasy to see whythere shouldbe difficultiesin applying the notionof cyclicalvariation to thepresent timeseries: some of themespeciallythat forFranceshowsuch jerkymotions or have 'Zor Theoricder
Masscnerscheinungcn,Freiburg, 1877,pp. 42 if. Later Karl
Pearson dissectedsuch distributionsinto fiveconstituents. Scalehas a great
deal to dowith thedistributionsobtained, alsowhether the logor log log is
considered.
'° Onecannot suppressthe remarkthat itmay seem odd tofind the deliber-
ately chosencrisis ratesnormallydistributed! Thiswould accordingto general
belief implythat manysmall, unrelatedcauses are at workto produce a normal distributioi. Thisseems to exclude
completely thatthey are productsof policy
decisions.
The answeris that, althougha series, whichreflectsmany small causes, takes
the form ofa normal distribution,theconverse is notnecessarily tnte.FREQUENCY DiSTRIBUTIONS AND CYCLES
distinct patternsdifferent from the familiar one of specific cycles.
that the use ofthe latter concept is somewhat shrouded indoubt.
The French pattern, e.g.,is shown in Chart 49. Start with t1and
assume this tobe the peak of one cycle; is thetrough at tor
Is there sense incalling the period t2 to t3 partof a "contraction"? Is
the next peak at t4 ort, the next trough at t6 orlater? Clearly the
definition of thecycle must govern itsdetermination, but thedan-
ger always existsthat definitions maybe used outside their proper
domain. Other serieshave cycles much more inthe traditional sense,
especially Great Britain,in which case thisprobably is the conse
quence of thefar more frequentchanges which,although policy
measures, produce acyclical pattern if the openmarket rate has
an independentcycle of sufficientstrength. This comesabout be-
cause theofficial rate was held onthe average aconventional dis-
tance abovethe open market rate.
The number ofcycles for the 463months11 before 1914 ismuch
smaller than in previousinstances (Table87). England has ten,
Germany eight,and France five.The average durationsshow
reciprocal relationships;the average fullcycle for theFrench rate
lasted 85.8 months, theBritish 44.9, and theGerman 56.6months.
While the distributionof the total durationis almostequally
divided, betweenexpansion andcontraction forEngland and Ger-
many, theFrench distribution is23.1 per cent to76.9 per cent. We
see here theconsequenceof using t3instead t2 in Chart 49 asthe
trough. If t had beenchosen, theroughly one to threeproportion
could easily havebecome three to one,depending on theconcrete
case.
For the interwarperiod (168 months) wecan onlyexpect very
11The basic series aremonthly averages,tending to makethem smoother
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Number and Duration of Specific Cycles ofCentral Bank








CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
NUMBER OF: AVERAGE DURATION OF:
(MONT iis)
Prewar, January 1876-July 1914,463 months"
10 10 10 22.622.344.9
5 5 5 19.866.085.8 23.1 8 8 8 29.427.258.6 51.9
Postwar, Januaiy 1925-December 1938,168 months
1 2 1 9.0
2 3 2 18.0
2 1 1 8.5
























'Duration of only complete cycles,expansions, and contractionsare included in their respective columns.
The percentagesare calculated from a base equalto the average duration of expansion plus that ofcontractions. The sum equals theaverage duration of cycles only when the numberof full cycles is thesame as the number of expansions and contractions.
'Only complete cyclesare counted; parts of cycles at bothends are dropped. Cycles are measured fromtrough to trough.
"The Central Bank discountrates of Germany and CreatBritain are season- ally corrected; the Bank ofFrance rate hadno seasonal trend. In the postwar period there wereno seasonal trends in any of the data.
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York discountrate.










tions cyclesFREQUENCY DiSTRIBUTIONS AND CYCLES
It is quite clear that the whole phenomenon of a cycle that
emerges with some clarity for the period before World War I is
now threatened,and that we are on uncertain groirnds if we want
to carry over our prewar description to the later period.All this is
of course not due to some "natural" cause, to be found in the be-
havior of other series that together determine that of the discount
rates, but it is instead the productof deliberate action, probably
caused by a change in the general goals of policy. The latter were
hardly clearer than in the time before 1914, as we have seen, but
the elimination of seasonal and other variations becauseof the
preference for maintaining stability was one of the variousgoals.
In other words, although we cannot give afull description of the
policy in either period, we are nevertheless able to note achange
and even to indicate its direction.
It is noteworthy that the difficulties of theBank of England after
1925 were hardly less than before 1914; yetthe bank discount rate
had fewer cycles than before.
(9) Another way of looking at the samephenomenon is through
the examination of the numbers of changesof the discount rates
in the respective prewar and postwarperiods. We do this in three
steps, by indicating thetotal number of changes and the average
number of changes per specific and perreference cycle. This in-
formation is embodied in Table 88. Attentionhas to be drawn espe-
cially to the behavior of the Frenchdiscount rate and to the fact
that, while in the 463 months beforeWorld War I there were only
55 changes, in the 168 postwarmonths there was almost the same
number-53---the frequency increasingafter 1934. The compari-
son of the prewarand postwar figures for the averagenumber of
changes during the respective referencecycles is striking; we dis-
cuss this matter insomewhat more detail below. The appearanceof
such wide divergences makes itdifficult to believe that the monetary
theory of business cycles appliesequally well for both periods:how
could the deliberate action of thecentral banksworking on the
discount ratesexpress itself insuch a widely divergentmanner?
Or were the cycles theyintended to influence so widely atvariance?
If this should be the answer, how can oneobtain theories of these
cycles whose applicability does notbecome too restrictive?
Further analysis of the behaviorof the official discount rates is
found in Table 89. This tabk is easyto read: we determinethe
number of zero, positive, andnegative changes; positiveand nega-
tive changes are subdividedinto classes whose(small) intervals
385-
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'tVerage c!niiies (leicrniiiietl for wholec-)Clcs, iliedsuutIIi oiii trough to
ii ((107!) . Avcrai7e.s for (i)Iuplete cycles lila)' not he etiiat to tIleSItni (if avcraas
of e\pil(sioI(s and coiitractiotis since theremay he expamisiolis or coiitrai'timis
W!il('Il an iii it part of complete celis.
'flip central hank (lIscolint rates of Germany aid (7rejt Britai ii an seasiiimallv
cc in (ct) d. ii n Bank if France rate hail110sea stimia It ni.iii tIIc/i.sI War period
there were iio seasonal trcn(ls in any (if the data.
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depend of course upon thenature of the Series and are t]ici&fiire
not the same for all four COufltrje, All thisis (lime for seven((In)-
plete and one incompletc five-yearperiod l)efore \VOrl(1 War I. and
for three completepostwar P('I'(lS. The tinderlitied figuresale
percentages, arranged so that all changes(including zero) for each
five-year intervalare taken as 100. Then the zero. ptiis and minus
changes (aiid thesum of the latter two) arc CX1)ressedas per-
centages. This pmits a (lirectComparisonit]all directions for the
same l)ank, for the different banks, and forall P'1ds.
It would lead too farto discuss this table exhaustively,so that
w'c shall point out only the highlights.But the reader should stud










( re.it Britain :39:3 21.1 17.7 :38.8 :30.525.] (50.0
(crluamiv 277 18.911.9 :33.8 21.320.1) .):3
I"raiice 55 (5.0 4()I Ott it) 2.8 7.5
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coat llrit;iiii :32 1.0 5.2 1:3.0 It)11.5 12.5
Cernitiv4 Il 6.5 &t) 16.1) I 2.t)12.5 3!.))
France 53 2.5 7.5 9(1 7.0 5.0 12.1)
Iiiitt'(l States 45 84) 7(150 6.511.5 27.0FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CYCLES
The absolute, average interest rate level ateach bank has
to be taken into account(see Tables 83 and 84); this makes a
greater or smaller spread of thevariations more or less probable.
The variations shown are, as we know,induced by external
and internal factors. Do these moredetailed frequency distribu-
tions give hints as to which arepreponderant?
Are there common signs of stresswhich would be revealed
by the large number of positivechanges in the higher class in-
tervals? (These mean of course byhow much the rate was changed
how many times.)
The five-year periods do notconform to any cyclical units,but
that does not matter, especially since we arenot necessarily looking
for the familiar cycles but mayfind crises, possibly distributed at
random, as in the cases of theearlier chapters.
Taking the prewar period it is atleast clear that the over-all
number of changes did not increase,that on the contrary there
appears to be adownward tendency. This is similar tothose ob-
served in different, but closelyrelated, fields such as seasonalvaria-
tions of interest rates. Adecrease could be interpreted as some
evidence of a growing stabilityof the financial system asfar as it is
represented by these and theearlier statistics Since thediscount
rates are heavilydetermined also by the externalrelations of the
country, a growingstability elsewhere wouldnaturally help to
improve it at home too.After World War I thetendency was re-
versed in France, a countrythat during these years waslaboring
under enormous internalpolitical difficulties (FrontPopulaire,
Stavisky scandal, etc.) andexperiencing a greatexternal strain at
least as long as thegold bloc held together. Onthe other hand no
changes at all occurred inthe rate of the Bankof England and the
Reichsbank after 1933. Theplus and minus changesfor each coun-
try do not alwaysbalance for each five-yearperiod. The explana-
tion is obvious. Somechanges may come atthe end, others at the
beginning of such aperiod, andmoreimportant_increases and
decreases usually aremade at different rates;since only the num-
ber of changes arecounted this is not taken intoaccount. But the
reasons can easilybe deduced fromTable 89. There onewill see
that for some centralbanks it is true that increasesby higher per-
centages are a little morefrequent thandecreases?2 In other words
This remark refersexclusively to the officialdiscount rates and not tothe
over-all "policy"; the same istrue of the precedinginterpretive remarks. What































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
the central banks appear to be more reluctant to "let go" than to
"take over"a not uncommon phenomenon associated with power.
(10) Now we take up three closely connected measurements
that have been used with the other series: we propose to study
(a) the concentration and dispersion of the specific cycle turning
points, (b) the correlation coefficients of the series, and (c) the
covariation with their reference cycles.
(a) The concentration and dispersionofpeaks and troughs is
examined only for the prewar series, since later there are not
enough observations (cf. Table 90). There are even then only five
groups of peaks and four of iroughs obtained for the three Euro-
pean central banks. This is considerably less than for the short-term
interest rates (cf. Table 93). The mean deviatiens for the average
TABLE 90
Concentration and Dispersion of Central Bank Discount
Rates, Specific Cycle Turning Points, Three European





Three European countriesJan. 1882 0.33
July 1889 7.33







Three European countriesMar. 1888 2.33
Oct. 1896 21.87
Jan. 1906 8.61 8.25 48.0
June 1914 0.33
Average Mean deviation of coinciding peaksas per cent of
Corresponding average for troughs
Three European countries 42%FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CYCLES
peaks and troughs have a very great range, from 0.38-7.83months
and 0.33-21.67 respectively. Especially the latterfigure stands
apart. Even the reference cycles were moreclosely packed. Of
course we found that troughs(here of more doubtful identification
than the peaks) are less likely to coincide than peaks;it is rea-
sonable to assume this for the present series too, aspolicy measures
would naturally tend to be used in simultaneous crisesbut relaxed
very differently. (Itmight be noted that at the trough the Reichs-
bank discount rate tended to lead the Bank ofEngland, which in
turn led the Bank of France.)
The average mean deviations are 8.47 months forpeaks and 8.25
f or troughsa much larger difference thanfor the private rates
(Tables 90 and 91). The difference would bestill larger, save for
the June 1914 value of only 0.33 months.This exception is easily
TABLE 91
Dispersion among Peaks and Troughs,Three European
Countries, 1876-1914
PEAKS ThOUGHS
Per centAverage- Per centAverage
corre- deviation corre-deviation
spondence(months) spondence(months)
understood in view of the imminenceof war, which caused the
central banks to begin raisingtheir rates in anticipation. It is most
remarkable that some of the yearswhich occur in Table 23 are not
repeated here, notably August 1893when the mean deviation for
that peak was zero; andthere is no other concentration near
enought On the other hand 1893 was a yearthat did not occur
among the referencedates either, although it iswell known that it
witnessed widespread, acute crises.Finally the percentages of the
turning points whichcoincide are worse here thanfor the private
rates. For peaks it is 65.2 percent, for troughs only48.0 per cent, as
compared with 72.0 per centand 73 per cent for the privaterates.
From this it becomesclear that the central bank ratesdo not show
a very uniformbehavior, either in regard totheir own short-term
rates and referencecycles, or to each other (seeTable 91). But all
393
I
Business cycles 100 2.44 100 2.25
Short-term interest rates 72 2.67 78 3.21
Central bank discount rates 65 3.47 48 8.25S
CENTRAL BANK DiSCOUNT RATES
this requires further investigation before Such a statementcan be
made more definite.
(b) Table 92 gives thecorrelationcoefJIcicnis of the threepairs
of European discount rates 1876-1914, and the sixpairs for the
interwar period 1925-1938. It may be recalled thatcorrelation co..
efficients take every single value of the time series intoconsjdera..
TABLE 92




January l925December 1938, 168months
tion; theymeasure thus muchmore than, say, cyclical interrela-
tionship and thereforethe two approachesmay yield quite differ- ent results. This pointbecomes importantagain, even when another equally noncychicalapproach is made,as below in section 6Ia
The reader willfurthermore recall whatwas said in Chapter III
"The same situationwas encountered before in ChapterIII, pg103 if. and especially in ChapterVI, passim.
394
Bank of England minimum discountrateBank of
France official discount rate
Bank of England minimum discountrateReichs..
+0.490.33 0.63
bank official hank discountrate
Bank of France official discountrateRejehsbank
+0.820.74 0.88
official bank discount rate
Bank of England minimum discountrateNew York
-f 0.460.29 0.60
Federal Reserve Bank discountrate
Bank of France official discountrateNew York
+0.860.80 0.90
Federal Reserve Bank discountrate
Reichsbank official bank discountrateNew York
+0.41024 0.56
Federal Reserve Bank discountrate +0.650.52 0.75
For confidence coefficientof 99%.
rEer Upper- Janua1y 1876July 1914, 46.3 months
Bank of England minimum discount rateBankof
France official discount rate
Bank of England minimum discountrateRcichs-
+0.530.44 0.61
bank official bank discount tate
flank of France official discountratcReichsbank
+0.730.67 0.78
official bank discount rate +0.420.32 0.52FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CYCLES
about correlation and functional dependency.'4 Here we are pri..
manly concerned with parallelism of our series without desiring
to jump to the conclusion that ifshown it signifies a causal (func-
tional) interrelationship. This does not apply to section 6 below,
where we shall examine correlation and cyclical covariation of
official discount rates and their respective open market rates.
TABLE 93
Interest Rate Correlation Coefficients
Before 1914 the correlation betweenthe British and German
rates is high (r = +0.73),while the other two pairs give much
less satisfactory results. In the interwarperiod the British and
American rates give r = 0.86and the previously mentioned rises
to 0.82; the others can more orless be neglected as not significant,
with the possible exception ofBerlinNew York where r = 0.65.'
Thus we find further confirmationof a none too strong parallelism
even when thecyclical approach is pushed into thebackground.
In general the coefficientsof correlation for the discount rates
paralleled those for open market rates.Table 93 shows that, par-
ticularly for the interwar years, theranking of the two groups gave
the same order. The independenceof the French money market
'This becomes important once morebelow in section 6 when comparing
the official and the open marketdiscount rates, where thecoefficients are
expected to show the existence of ahighly plausible functional interdependency.
See also the remarks madethere about our use of seasonallyuncorrected data.
' These coefficients must beviewed in the light of the numberof observa-
tions, which is higheven inthe much shorter postwarperiod (168 months).
The difference between the prewarand postwar samples is great,but because
of their absolute magnitudes a separatesignificance test is not required.The
same situation wasencountered previously andexplained, for the first time,
in footnote 24 of ChapterIII; cf. also the remarks onsignificance regarding
the coefficient C of covariationthere and below, section 6.The confidence lunits






market rates discount rates
New york-London +0.45 +o. +0.86
London-Berlin +0.73 +0.73 +o.a +0.82
New York-Berlin +0.40 +0.77
New York-Paris +0.36 +0.34 +0.41
London-Paris +0.61 +0.53 +0.34 +0.49
Berlin-ParIs +0.62 +0.42 +0.13 +0.464
CENTRAL BANK DiSCOUNT RATES
and central bank is brought out, again most notably in the interwar
years, by the low values of the coefikient. The relationships for
London with New York and Berlin increased after 1914, whereas
that with Paris decreased.
(c) The covariation of the specific cycles with theirrespective
reference cycles is of more than general interest, Therelation
between these two deserves particular attention from thepoint of
view of most versions of the monetary theory of the businesscycle.
One version of that theory claims that a credit expansion,in its
early stages perhaps fed by an influx of goldor other funds from
abroad, might come to an end through interference by thecentral
bank, which operates effectively mostly at the two turningpoints;
i.e., when activity is low, the central bank lowers therate, dragging
most others down with it and thus stalting the upturn.When
activity is high, the central bank, fearful of the depletionof its
reserves_mostly through external drain of gold fromcountries
where prices have not risenas muchcuts further expansion by
rate increases.
Other versions attributea different behavior to the central
bank: they claim thatan expansion-_and consequently the sub-
sequent contraction__would never reachgreat heights or depths
respectively had not the central bank inits role as the lender of
last resort continued to accommodatethe commercial banks and
thus fed the expansionistmovement until it turned inflationary.
Only at the end would the centralbanks raise their rates sharply.
Whatever the version, theexpectation is for a high degree of
correspondence between the business cycleand the discount rates.
In general the discountrate troughs lagged behind the reference
cycle troughs; only the Bankof England rate led at the peak.Of
course even a persistent lag between bothseries expresses a corre-
spondence; an illustration will bcgiven below,p. 404, where the lags of the officialdiscount rates behind theopen market rates
are analyzed in greater detail.
Taking our referencecycles we obtain Table 94 andfind for
Great Britain and Germanybefore World War Ia high and for
France a low degree ofcorrespondence.1e The total correspondence,
2The latter need not followfrom the low variability andpeculiar cycles of the French discountrate, since there could still bea good covariatlou with reference cycles that would thenbe out of sten with thoseof the other coun- tiles. The one or the othermust at least be d. ease' of the discount rate may be out of step withIts own reference cycle, andboth with the reference cycles of the othertwo countries.FREQUENCY DiSTRiBUTIONS AND CYCLES
TABLE 94
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Central Bank
Discount Ratest and Their Respective Reference Cycles
SAME PHASE: 1)1/.. SAME PHASE: Df-
Ex- Con- ferentEr- Con- ferent
panslons fractions Total phase panslons tiactlons Total phase
The rates for Germany and Great Britain areseasonally adjusted. The rates
for France had no seasonal trends.
bPeriods covered: Great Britain, January 1876-July1914, 463 months; France,
January 1876-July 1914, 463 months; Germany,February 1879-July 1914, 426
months.
In the postwar period none of the rateshad seasonal trends.
dPeriod covered for France: January1925-December 1935, 132 months. In
the case of the three other countries there were nospecific cycles in the discount
rates after 1931.
New York Federal Reserve Bankdiscount rate.
in the order named, is 70.0,81.5, and 57.9 per cent. The first two
are high, but nothigher than some covariationsencountered before.
The open market rates (Table 14)showed in every instance a better
correspondence and even their lowest wasslightly better than the
best now. The Bank of Englanddoes not emerge as the best con-
forming in spite of the most numerouschanges in its rate. Instead
it is the Reichsbankwhich gives a value closest tothat of the
short-term rate covariation. As aconsequence these twointerest
rates will show anextremely high correspondencewith each other
(see Table 97).
The distribution of thenumber of months for whichcovariation
can be observed ishighly irregular; the French casewith a small
percentage for expansion isof course a direct outcomeof the
arbitrary choice made indefining a specific cycle there(see the





Great Britain172 152 324139 87.1 32.870.030.0
France 74 194268195 16.0 41.957.942.1
Germany 192 155347 79 45.1 38.481.518.5
Postwar,' January 1925-December 1931,84 months4
Great Britain 14 38 52 32 16.7 45.261.938.1
France 22 37 59 73 16.7 28.044.755.3
Germany 22 23 45 39 26.2 27.453.646.4
United States38 28 68 18 45.2 33.378.621.4CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
percentages of expansion over those of contraction inshort.term
interest rates; for the discount rates it is inconclusive.
The statistics for the postwar periodcan be treated onlywith
great caution because of the smallness of the sampleand the dis.
appearance of cycles in the discount rates in theconventional sense,
at least after 1933. At any rate we observe,as often before,a deterioration in previously shown regularitiesevenif thesewere not of particularly high order. This is thecase in eveiy single
instance. The newly added data for theUnited States (takingthe
rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York)exceed in covaria..
tion all others and wouldeven be second best in the prewarperiod. But here too cycles disappeared altogetherafter September1937; the rate was heldconstant at one per cent throughoutWorld War II.
Summing up (c): the fairly goodcovariation between discount
rates and reference cycles is insufficientto "prove" or "disprove"
either version of the traditionalmonctaiy theory of the cycle.An outstanding characteristic is howeverthat the lack ofuniform behavior in thecase of each single country andbetweenprewar and postwar for allcountries raises doubtsas to the generality of
the assertion of themonetary theory. In view of theextraordinary complexity of economicfluctuations itis hardly surprisingthat simple theories fail17
Section 6. Central BankDiscount Rates and
Open Market Short-TermRatcs
(11) Whatever thegoals of central bankpolicy may have been at various times in thedifferent countries,there is one frequently found among them:the official discountrate should be held above "the" open marketrate. Thisexpresses the desire to "control"the market and incidentallyit attaches to the bankrate something ofa punitive character.It istherefore ofconsiderable interest to investigate themovements and the relativepositions of the two rates for ourcountries. To some extentthis has been donein the literature, but onlysporadically and forshort periods. Thoughthe question seems exceedinglysimple, we shallsoon see that it has a number of perplexingaspects which we shallnot be able to clear up satisfactorily inthis chapter.The same type ofquestion.
One recalls the famousdisclaimer of R. C',.H. Hawtrey that thereare no more monetary cycles sincethe end of the goldstandard.
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especially as dealt with in the later part of this sectionreappears
in Chapter IX where the intricate relationships of short-term and
long-term rates are considered.
The next question is whether to expect cycles in series obtained
by deducting the open market from the official rate, it is not at all
easy to form an opinion a priori, either on the basis of our know!-
edge of the cyclical behavior of the constituent series, or on that
of the significance or economic meaning of the new series.
However, since the variability of the discount rates is highest
for the Bank of England and lowest for the Bank of France we
may expect that the variations of their respective differentials wifi
differ most from both basic cycles in Britain and in France repeat
more faithfully the movements of the open market rate.18 Since
the latter are cyclical the difference will be cyclical too. The possible
variants are familiar from the preceding chapters.
Charts 50 and 51 show three prewar and postwar European and
the postwar New York series. Limiting ourselves to the pre-Worid-
War-I period, a seemingly great randomness appears to prevail.
But it is known that visual inspection can be a very unreliable
guide, especially in determining cycles that are of complicated
structure. So, although there are objections to smoothingof time
series when looking for cycles, tweloe-rnonth moving averages were
applied; in all instances cycles and other configurations appear.
Smoothing operations often tend to transpose cycles; sometimes
they produce artificial cycles or exaggerate turning pointswhich
are merely summations of randomfactors in the basic series.
Whether a transposition of peaks and troughs occurshere and
how far it goes is hard to decide when the cycles are notwell
established in the first place. The cycles of the moving averages are
compared with the reference cycles. These are themselves averages
of an extremely high order into which, incidentally,the present
series did not enter. The study showed solittle correspondence that
it must be considered a genuine disparityof movement and not
the consequence of our taking the specificcycles of the smoothed
curves. Statistical experiencemakes it clear that, even if a trans-
position of turning points had occurred, it cannothave been nearly
as great as shown. We canthus claim confidently that these differ-
entials and reference cycles do not varytogether.
This is especially true for the many years from June1900 to February 1901
when the bank rate in France was constant! Sothe cycles of the differential
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Escess of Bank of France official discount rate
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Differentials between Central Bank Discount Rates




1925 '26'27'2829'33 '3132 33'34'35'36'3?38
402Per Cent
+1.5
New York, Postwar, 1 924i 938
CENTRAL BANK AND OPEN MARKET RATES
We compare dircctltj the official and open market rates. Their
specic cycles are known and together they give the statistics of
Table 95. For Great Britain and Germany (pre-World-War-1) total
correspondence is 81.5 and 80.6 per cent respectively; France
scores only 52.7 per cent. In the interwar period two covariations
CHART 51
Differentials between Central Bank Discount Rates and the
Open Market Short-Term Rates
12-month rnOvng average
I I I I I I
1924 25 '2'27'28'293031'32'333435'36'37'38
stand out: the American, using the commercial paper rate, with
83.3 per cent and the German with 81.0 per cent. The figuresfor
Creat Britain and France show negligible correspondence.The
New York call money rate gives a far inferior result. This is not
the first time this happens.'9 The period, January1925December
i, rnmprisee a larger part of theshort era when the Federal
Reserve authorities believed in stabilization, andthe theory was
widely held that the discount rate should fallprecisely between
that for bank acceptances as the lower and thecommercial paper
rate as the higher.2°
1'Othrs are found in Table 27. This does notnecessarily support the view
held by some economists that it was "the" short-term money rate parexcellence
on the New York market forbusiness cycle analysis.
"This is found in many books of the periods, notably in W. R.Burgess, The
Reserve Banks and the Money Market, rev. ed., 1936, p.227; see also Chart 35
there. In the months before the 1929 collapse atthe New York Stock Exchange
the Federal Reserve rate is seen to stay below thislower limit. To attribute
the excess of speculation and subsequent eventslargely to this mild and brief,
though wholly unjustified, occurrence would be farfetched. Instead one might
403CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
TABLE 95
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Central Bank
Discount Rates and Open Market Interest Ratesa
SAME PHASE: 1)14.. SAME PHASE: Dlf
Ex- Con- ferentEr- Con
pensions traction: Total phase pansions traction: Totalphase
(i1oNrns) (PERCENTAGES)










'In the prewar period the central bank discountrates for Great Britain and
Germany, and all the open market rates,are seasonally adjusted. The central
bank discount rate for France hadno seasonal trend. In the postwar period only
the short-term interest ratesare seasonally adjusted; the central bankrates had no seasonal trend.
bNew York Federal Reserve Bank discountrate and New York conunercial paper rate.
'New York Federal Reserve Bank discountrate and New York call money rate.
A particular interest attachesto the lead and lag relationship
between the official discountrates and the private, open market
rates. Central banks making decisiveuse of their discount rates
during times of expansionwould be expected toraise them with
a view thereby to bringing theopen market rate under control
and letting their ratesgo down again after theopen market rates
have passed their peak.The statistics of Table 96give the timing of
these two series for allfour countries, althoughfor the United
States naturally only for thetime after World War I. Theyshow that the open marketrates lead at the peak quitepersistently, the only exception in theover-all picture being England,where an






























Postwar, Januaiy 1925-December 1931,84 months
14 28 42 42 16.7 33.3
1 43 44 40 1.2 51.2
35 33 68 16 41.7 39.3
43 27 70 14 51.2 32.1
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TABLE 96




discount ratesof Federal RELATIVE TO CORRESPONDING TURNS IN:
Reserve Bankof N.Y. Callmoneyrates Commercial paper rates
(months)
For footnotes see section 4 of Table 96.
average lead of the official rate of 1.6months at the peak developed
for the classical gold standard period. Regarding thetrough, one
would likewise expect a lead of the open market rates and our
statistics bear this out in the average without exception.
On occasion lags of the official rates appear that are solong, e.g.,
22 months in England and even up to 37 months inFrance, that
doubt is raised whether such periods should beinterpreted within
the framework of the notions of "lead" or lag." Theserequireun-
less the series compared with each other are in no wayfunctionally
relatedthat the activities be embedded into some commonwork!
where interaction is possible. This raises once morethe issue of the
speed of interaction between economic quantities, afactor that has
had to be alluded to repeatedly in thisstudy. Unfortunately too
little is known in this area to gosignificantly beyond the immediate
interpretation of the present data. In factthese problems have not
even been put in the literaturein a systematic manner. it isclear
however that there are many other dangerouspitfalls; for example
it may very well be that the peaksand troughs are not nearly as
important as the rapidity withwhich they are approached in suc-
cessive steps for each of the two series.This may furthermore be
tied up significantly with the extentof the movements, especially
405
TNov. 1917 +24b(11/15) +18b(5/16)
PApr. 1921 +17b(11/19) +6(10/20)
TJan. 1923 +7(6/22) +Sb(8/22)
P Apr. 1924 +8b(8/23) +llb(5/23)
TJan. 1925 +4(9/24) +3(10/24)
P July1927 +17b(2/26) +9b(10/26)
TJan. 1928 +4(9/27) +2(11/27)
P Oct. 1929 +7(3/29) +2 (8,129)
TSept. 1931 +4(5/31) 0(9/31)
PJan. 1932 +1(12/31) 0(1/32)For footnotes see section 4 of Table 96.
for a rising open marketrate, and therefore with the desired severity
of the policy measure.
Coirelation coefficients for eachpair of series are' contained in
Table 97, the postwar periodextending to December 1938. These
coefficients are directly comparablewith each other, no special
significance test for the differencesbeing required. But caution in
their interpretation isnecessary for other reasons.
First, the prewar coefficientsare very high, especially for England
Turning d(aoS In
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where r = +0.93. But this is notunreasonable, because strictly
functional interdependence is almostpostulated by current2' mone-
tary theory and banking practice.Even for France a high coefficient
(r = +0.74) obtains, but even thedropping of the cyclical approach
cannot prevent it from being againthe poorest of the measurements.
In general the arrangementof the coefficients is strikinglysimilar
to that of Table 95.
Second, the postwar coefficients, nowalso including the United
States, are in each individual casehigher than the respective prewar
coefficients. Twothose for theBritish and American ratesare
even +0.99, a trulyremarkable figure from many pointsof view.
For Germany and France thevalues are +0.94 and +0.90,hardly
less surprising. This requirestherefore four brief comments:
"This is to be taken with a grainof salt. Both were current before1914,
doubtful in the 1920's, and no longerapplicable for the greater part ofthe
1930's. This is not of great Importancefor us, since we deal essentiallyonly




















Turning dates Lead () or Lag (+)
In discount rate, relative to corresponding turn
Bank of France in open market discount rate'
For footnotes see section 4 of Table 96. (tabla continues)ci:N'I'RAL BANK l)ISCOUNT hATES
'TABLE 96, COfltilItlC(I
4. Germany
7irmng(tat CS Lead ( - ) or lag (--
in discount roic, re!alite toCOTTCSp011(tHt(lur,i
c;erIJl(I1l liCicltSb(Ik i, ope, ;im rk't li(,ittrcz(e
(months)
TOcL1816 +1 (9/76)
P May1877 0 (5/71)
'l'Julv1879 -1-2 (5/79)
P Feb.1882 0 (2/82)
'F Jan.1883 0 (1/88)
1' Feb.1890 (1 (2/90)
TOct.1892 -1-5 (5/92)
P Aug.18113 0 (8/93)
T I)ec.1891 0 (12/94)
Pjune1900 -13 (3/00)
TScpt. 19(12 -1-2 (7/02)
I'Oct.1904 +14b (8/03)
TAug.1905 +4 (4/05)
1' Mar.1907 4 (7/07)
TMay 1909 4-6 (11/08)
P Sept. 1913 -1-7 (2/13)
T July1911 +3 (4/14)
P Dcc.1923
TMay 1927 4-10 (7/26)
POct.1929 +5 (5/29)
1' Sept.1930 1 (8/30)
1' Aug.11131 0 (8/31)
T -= trough.
P - peak.
I )ates in parentheses arc for corresponding turns.
Lead or lag is greater than half the expansionor contraction phase for the
open market rate in which the central bank rate's turning point falls.
(a) Such high correlation coefficientsarc rare when the' are
viewed properly, i.e., in the Spirit of the theory of correlation.22 We
1)elieve this to be the case; thusan almost 1)erfcct functional inter-
dependence between the two series is made plausible.If the corre-
lation of various official discount rates (ef.Table 93) had yielded
similarly high coefficients,an interpretation would not have been
easy, since it would have been necessary toassume that some(uS-
count rate really uorninated that of anothercountry, and ther
Otherwise we might havean instance of 'proving too nuich." \Vheiievcr
this happens in an essentially mathematicaloperation itis a clear indication










evidence of this. The drawbackfor the present case lies however in
the high stability of all ratesfrom 1931 on which mightcontribute
unduly to this result. We havetherefore added a computation cover-
ing only 1925-1931 andthe results are (cf. Table 97)almost the
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Coincident 3 2 1
Lagl-8 4 5 1 1
Lag 7-12 1 1
Lag> 12 1 1
Total 9 10 3 2
Average lead ()
or lag (-I-) 1.6+4.0 +-7+7.0









Lag 1-8 1 8 1 2
Lag 7-12 1 1
Lag> 12 1
Total 3 3 3 3
Average lead ()
or lag (+) +8.3+4.0 +-7 +1.7Lead> I2inos.
Lead 7-12
Lead 1 to 6
Coincident




Lead 7 to 12








TIMINC OF DISCOUNT RATE, BANE OFFRANCE RELATIVE TO PARIS OPEN MARKET DISCOUNTRAI
TIMING OF DISCOUNT RATE,GERMAN REIcuj
ELATIVE TO BERLIN OPEN MAREETDISCOUNT RATE
(b) The correlationcoefficients were computed forseasonally un- corrected data. The suspiciontherefore prevails thata common factor, the seasonalvariations, has producedan artificially high cor- relation if viewed fromthe needs of determininga deeper lying
interdependence Thepresent case makes suchan interpretation unlikely. Theseasonal factors in the officialand private discount rates are not sufficiently similar,although in some instancesof the periods covered they havecontributed to raise thecorrelation coefficients.CENTRAL BANK AND OPEN MARKET RATES
TABLE 97
Correlation between Central Bank Discount Rates and
Short-Term Interest Rates, Seasonally Uncorrected Data
For confidence coefficient of 99%.
Table 11, giving the seasonal indexes for the short-term openmarket
rates, should be compared withthe discussion in Appendix A of
this chapter. Before 1914 the central bank rateshad seasonals with
several interruptions (two consecutive years inEngland, four in
Germany plus other, shorter ones); there were nonein France, and
they disappeared for all countries afterWorld War I. The indexes
of open market rates underwent several changes too,for Germany
not less than four times between1876 and 1912, and for all with
not inconsiderable shifts.Although there is a rough over-all similarity






January 1876-July 1914,483 months
Bank of England minimum discount rate-London
open market rate +0.930.910.94
Bank of France official discount rate-Paris market
discount rate +0.740.680.79
Reichsbank official bank discount rate-Berlin pri..
vate discount rate +0.91 0.890.93
January 1925.-December 1938, 168 months
Bank of England minimum discount rate-London
open market rate +0.990.990.99
Bank of France official discount rate-Paris market
discount rate +0.900.850.93
Reichsbank official bank discount rate-Berlin pn-
vate discount rate +0.94 0.91 0.96
New York Federal Reserve Bank discount rate-
New York commercial paper rate +0.99 0.990.99
January 1925-December 1931,84 months
Bank of England minimum discount rate-London
open market rate +0.960.930.98
Bank of France official discount rate-Paris market
discount rate +0.900.83 0.94
Reichsbanlc official bank discount rate-Berlin pri-
vate discount rate +0.890.81 0.94
New York Federal Reserve Bank discount rate-
New York commercial paper rate +0.98 0.960.99CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
not very close and detailed. The highest and most suspect coefficients
are obtained for the period 1925-1938. It is noteworthy however that
the lowest coefficient, +0.74, refers to France18761911, i.e., to
the country where one series, that of the official rate, definitely ha(l
no seasonal variations. Even so the coefficient is exceedingly high,
as correlation coefficients go.
(c) The great similarity of the coefficients is the more remarkable
inasmuch as there were not only considerable differences in the
financial organi7ations of these four countries but each underwent
material changes over time. These differences were pointedout.
Among them the fact that the British is a minimum and the German
a maximum rate is one of the most significant.23
(12) (a) Correlation of directions of change in discountrates of
various central banks (Table 98). The threeprewar coefficients are
extremely high, especially that correlating the Bank of Englandrate
with the French rate, C= 0.818; but it derives from only 44 cases
out of 463 months. The coefficients for the British-Germanand
French-German rates are 0.746 and 0.666, all higher(with p
0.001) than any previously observed. The coefficientsfor the six
postwar relationships are not included, because theyare without
exception insignificant, certainly in great contrastto the high prewar
correspondence. Table 92 had not shown thesame for the correlation
coefficients that likewise do not takenotice of cycles as such. But,
unlike the present coefficient, they take all thedata of each period
into account including the long parallel(horizontal) stretches. Any
direct comparison of C andr is of course out of the question, though
an ordering according to rank is permissible.
The chief difference between thetwo noncyclical measurements
is in regard to the postwar period:the coefficient C yields only
insignificant values for 1925-1938 whileat least two, if not even
three, correlation coefficientsare highly significant. Indeed those for
the Bank of England and theFederal Reserve Bank of New York
and of the Bank of Englandand the Reichsbankare substantially
higher than any for theprewar period. During the latter the Bank
of England and theReichsbank, givingr = +0.73, are the best
scoring group, whilenow this relationship ranks behind thenon-
cyclical covariation of theBritish-French rates.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5CENTRAL BANk DISCOUNT RATES
These differenoes are accounted for in the varying approach and
procedure; although both are noncyclical and monthly, C is ob-
tained from month to month comparisons, which naturally leave
greater play to cyclical components. The correlation coefficients too
are affected, if common factors, e.g., cycles, seasonal, etc., are con-
tained in the series.
(b) Change in the official rate correlated u'ith a change in the open
market short-term rate. Section b of Table 98 corresponds to Table
95 for the cycles and to Table 97 for the correlation coefficients. Here
we obtain good results for both periods. N is far larger than in the
previous cases. There is a great difference in Z, the number of parallel
movements. It is highest for Britain, as might be expected, and C
is very significant with 0.751. In France C = 0,769, but Z is only
46; this goes to show that in the rare cases when the French official
rate was changed, there was a close parallel movement with theopen
market rate. The interwar period however is really inte:esting in that
it yields the highest coefficient yet found, C = 0.92 1 for France. For
London and New York the results are also very good, if the New York
commercial paper rate is taken while there is, as riotedon other
occasions (cf. footnote 25), a less satisfactory agreement with the
New York call money rate.
Section 7. Discount Rate Differentials,
Open Market Rate Differentials,
and Exchange Rates
(13) In the same manner and for thesame reasons that led to the
formation of short-term interest rate differentialswe form those for
official discount rates. The motivation is if anythingeven stronger,
since deliberate policy often strove to keep the discountrate above
that of another country in orderto defend the gold reserves of the
country. The defense was in general only of the goldreserve of the
central bank. The differentialswere undoubtedly watched by the
central banks and definitely become ofsignal importance whenever
a change in the rate was caused,or indicated, for external reasons
in the sense discussed above liisection 2. But the attention paid was
probably not continuousas is obvious at least from the French situa-
tion where this would hardly haveserved a good purpose. We cannot
therefore expectas close an association between these differentials
and the exchange ratesas in the previous case, wherea rudimentary
mechanism set forces inmotion to take care of changing conditions
414DIFFERENTIALS AND EXCHANGE RATES
by initiating flows of funds. The official ratesand hence their
differentialswould become operative only when the private
mechanism seemed to gain such momentumas to endanger the basis
upon which it rested, or when it refused to work. There are however
hardly any indications of such events in the pre-World-War-I
period. For them to occur it would have beennecessary to interfere
with the mechanism by not allowing it to work. This happened only
from 1931 on when exchange controls began toappear.
We shall deal with the statistics of this section only in the briefest
manner. They are easily read and fall into the pattern established
before. New questions of procedure do not arise and the qualifica-
tions to which the methods are subject were amply discussed.
There are four stages: (a) frequency distributions, (b) number
and duration of cycles, (c) comparison of the new differentials with
the old, (d) behavior of the new differentials in respect to the ex-
change rates. The information is contained in Tables 99 to 105.
(a) Thefrequency distributionsof Table 99 are the direct out-
come of those of the underlying universes by forming their differ-
ences. In particular their see-saw appearances are not surprising in
view of the uncommon character of the basic distributions, for
which however an excellent interpretation suggested itself. The
customary measures are given again in the table, although there still
is doubtthough less than in Tables 83 and 84whether they suffi-
ciently describe the distributions. The reader may therefore wish
to rely more on the graphs, rather than to take standard deviations
and coefficients of variation such as they are. Nevertheless this much
may be said: all prewar and some postwar distributions show enor-
mous, steep peaks which contain more than one fourth of the total
observations (in one postwar case, Berlin over London, even more
than one half). This would be remarkable under any circumstances,
but is so especially when it obtains after forming differences.24 In
spite of this steepness the distributions are not as unsymmetrical as
was previously the case.
Additional interesting information is found in Table 100, where
are computed the percentages of all cases on which one of the two
central bank rates forming a pair was higher. The same was carried
out for the open market rates in Table 26, with which the present
one should be compared. The generally lower level of rates in France
is confirmed for the prewar period, while after World War I this
Varying the class intervals would make comparatively little difference; this




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6- 'Proportion of times differential between two central bank rates was positive.
role falls undisputedly to the rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. The Reichsbank rate was then again in all instances
higher, hardy surprising for a country that had passed througha
large inflation and was (partially as a consequence) heavily Indebted
abroad. Itisthusdfferentinnefromthe1operomtnotin
Table 26 when the two New York market rateswere in all cases higher
than the Paris private rate. At the time thiswas an Indication of
high investment opportunity with accompanying higherrisk in the
United States as compared with saturation andan attitude of safety
first in France. The private rates are to be understood onlyas ropes-
sentative of an entire level of interest rates. These dataapproximate
the notion of an international systemofrelative prices. The relations
are maintained for both the private and the official rates. In both
Tables 100 and 26 the same orderingemerges for the period before
1914, although the number of occasions when thesame rates are
higher than the respective othersare somewhat different Such
parallelism is noteworthy, especially since differencesamong magni-
hides of various countriesare involved and each difference may well
ref er to widely different absolutemagnitudes.
(b) The numbers of cycles (Table101) are small: four to seven
for the prewar and onlyone (or two) in the postwar period. Thi
excludes the postwar figures fromserious consideration. Berlin-.
London has an averageprewar duration of 96 months, by far the
j
CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
TABLE 100
Frequency of the Positive Central Bank Discount Rate
Differentials
Januaty 1876July 1914, 463 rnonths
Bank of England Bank of France 53.8
Reichsbank Bank of England 81.4
Reichsbank Bank of France 89.6
January 1925-December 1938,188 months
Bank of France Bank of England 67.3
Reichsbank Bank of England 98.8
Ref chsbank Bank of France 85.7
Bank of EnglandNew York Federal Reserve Bank 80.4
Bank of France New York Federal Reserve Bank 63.1
Reichsbank New York Federal Reserve Bank 100,0
422
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TABLE 101
Number and Duration ofSpecific Cycles of Central BankDiscount





NUMBER OF: AVERAGE DURATION OF: CYCLES
Er- Con-Full Ex- Con-Full Ex- Con- Excess of: pansfons tracffons cycles pansionstiactions cycles pensions tractions
longest duration ever observed-a lengthcompletely incompatible
with any reasonable intuitive interpretationthat aims to connect the
cycles with automatic short-term capital flowsor to accord the
latter a corrective influence. But this isnot surprising, since these
series do not describe anything automatic (in thesense of the "free
interplay of market forces"); cf. Table 28.25
(c) The discount rate differentialsmay be compared with those of
the open market rates (cf. Table 102). This gives fairto good covaria-
lion in the prewar period; it is best with 80.0per cent for Paris-
Berlin. While this is good for series not directly connected,it is not
very high for the present series, which are so closely, almost func-
tionally, associated within each pair. In thiscase the postwar period
now yields better results than the prewar; Paris-New York shows
even 100 per cent covariation; Paris-Berlin has now become the
poorest pair. This general improvement for the postwar periodre-
flects the fact that the postwar movements of theopen market interest
There are no "short cycles" in these series in the sense of the defInitionon
page 286 if. This accounts for the omission of the corresponding measures in
the tables immediately following.
423
(MONTHS)
January 1876-July 1914,463 months
Berlin over London 5 5 4 51.6 33.496.0 60.7 39.3 Paris over London 7 0 6 37.7 20.367.558.9 41.1 ParisoverBerlin 7 7 7 24.7 36.961.640.1 59.9
January 1925-December 1938
BerlinoverLondon 2 1 1 16.0 21.042.0 43.2 56.8 ParisoverLondon 2 2 1 34.5 83.024.05L1 48.9 Paris over Berlin 2 2 1 34.0 23.022.0 59.6 40.4 New York over London2 1 1 24.0 33.064.0421 57.9 Paris over New York 8 3 2 26.7 18.735.058.8 41.2 New York over Berlin 2 2 1 25.5 9.543.0 72.9 27.1TABLE 102
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Centr.tl BankDiscount Rate
Differentials and Short-Term Interest ilate Differentialsi
'Cenbal Bank differentials do not havea seasonal trend. Short-term interest rate djffereyjij are seasonally corrected.
The following are the exact periods coveredby the respective pairs: Berlin_L(Ijcj,n, 1878-July 1914; Pari._Lond, Oct. 1878-July1914 ParIs-Berlin, Nov. 1877-July1914.
rates were increasingly subjectedto controls. This brought them by
necessity more in line with the alreadycontrolled official rates. Since
this was a simultaneousprocess in many countries, It producesthe
above-mentioned resultseven for the differentials.
Table 103 leads to the fourthpoint (d). The correlation is shown
for both the privatedifferentials and the exchangerates, The data for the latterare repeated in Table 103 forconvenience; in the pre-
war period we now have only threepairs. Whatever differenceswe have so far noted for thediscount rate differentials,they behave in regard to theiraverage deviations fromzero exactly like the open
market rate differentials.Since the latterwere found to have had signs negatively correlatedwith those f the exchangerates, the same
necessarily holds also for theformer.
(d) The covanation ofthe central bankrate differential, with the respective exchangerates25relates only to specificcycles, since the former showno short cycles. Table 104is thus to be comparedes-
The pairing Is again uniquelydetermined s in Chapter VI(p 2$O).
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Months
coveredb










































































































DIFFERENTIALS AND EXCHANGE RATES
TABLE 103
Sign Correlation between Differentials of Central Bank Discount Rates,
Short-Term Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates
Average Deviation from Zero and Difference from Parity





London+ 0- + 0-
Berlin ++ 0 ++ 0
January 1925December 1938
BATES DIFFERENTIAL EXCHANCE BATEb
Paris London Berlin Paris London Berlin
o++ - 0+ -- 0
New New New
Berlin Paris London York Berlin Paris London York Berlin Paris London York




Berlin York London Paris Berlin York London Paris Berlin York London Paris
Berlin 0+++ 0+++ 0+++
New Yorkc- 0++-0--- 0+-
London-- 0+-+ 0+-- 0-
Paris--- 0-+- 0-++ 0
New Yorkd +
= average difference of interest rates positive.
- = average difference of interest rates negative.
b+ = more than 50% of exchange rate observationsabove parity.
- = more than 50% of exchange rate observationsbelow parity.
'Commercial paper rate.
1CalJ money rate.
sentially with Tables 66 and 67, although Tables 70 and 71should
also be considered. The present differentials have noseasonals, but
the exchange rates were taken in their corrected form. Itwill be re-
called that the correspondence in the earlier ease was none toogood,
though significant when specific cycles were used; wefound that the
high speed of adjustment between the forcesrepresented by the
movement of the series made a quicker reactionplausible. Thus we
obtained much better results for short cycles and must nowagain
425(MONTHS)
1877-1914
Berlin-London 414 81 82 163251 19.8 19.839.4eo Paris-London 401 140 77 217184 34.9 19.254,149 Paris-Berlin 440 102 173 275165 23.2 39.362.537,5
1925-1931
New York-London 84 16 21 37 47 19.0 25.044.056.0 Paris-New York 84 12 26 38 48 14.8 31.045.254.8 New York-Berlin 84 21 8 3549 32.1 9.541.75 Berlin-London 84 15 48 63 21 17.9 57.175.025,0 Paris-London 84 18 26 42 42 19.0 31.050.050.0 Paris-Berlin 84 38 20 58 28 45.2 23.889.031.0
Central Bank differentials do not havea seasonal trend. Foreign exchange rates are seasceally
corrected.
The following are the exact periods covered bythe respective pairs: Berlin-London,J 1880-July 1914; Paris-London, Feb. 1881-July1914; ParIs-Berlin, Nov. 1877-july 1914.
expect poorer ones. Only if the attitude regarding cyclesbe drasti-
cally changed mighta higher correspondence result This is carried
out below when we come to Table 105.
Whether the approach be cyclicalor not, the question of the degree
of covariation isa central one. The banks of issue guardover the
exchanges but they do not necessarilyoperate in the market ccii-
tinuously (under classical gold standardconditions) and they have
several means of interfering. Thisand the discontinuity in theuse
of some means, together withthe repetition of these conditionsIn
the other countries (with whichthe d1fferentjis formed) make
a high degree of covariatlon still less likely.
Actually the covanation shoiIn Table 104 Is not conclusivehi either direction, becausesome pairs fare better and othersworse than they do In Tables66 and 87. Paris-LondonIs almost equally good for theprewar period in both cases, Paris-Berlin,now with 62.5 per cent of all monthsin the same phase, is markedlybet than the 45.8per cent In the former table,. Thesama ps sow. 89.0 for the postwar periodand 81.9 in the previouschapter. The
- (PERCENTAGES)
TABLE 104
Phase Comparison of Specific Cycles of Central Bank DiscountRate
Differentials and Foreign Exchange Rates
CENTRAL BANE DiSCOUNT RATES
SAME PRAS Dif.. SAME PHASE:
Months Er.. Con- ferentLx- Ca







DIFFERENTiALS AND EXCHANGE RATES
TABLE 105
Change in the Central Bank Discount Rate Differential
Correlated with the Change in Exchange Rate:
Covariation in the Direction of the Movements,
Seasonally Uncorrected Data
N = Number of observations of changes. Zero changes in either or both
items are not counted.
2= Number of times the changes in the items showed the same sign.
p = Probability that an observeddeviation from the expected value as
greater is due to chance.
C = Coelficient of covariation.
highest postwar value is reached by BerlinLondon, 75.0 per cent,
which was then only 63.1 per cent. All others are withoutsignifi-
cance. Three of the present six postwarfigures are better than even
those for the short cycles in the earlier case; this may serve as an
illustration of the great difficulty of making significant measurements
in this entire field; at least this is true for the presentlevel of the
statistical investigation.
The sign correlation of Table 105 is to be comparedwith Table
65. As before the postwar measures must bediscarded, since the
level of probability is quite unsatisfactory. The three prewar cases
produce very low coefficients of covariation, the bestof which would
only take fourth place in Table 65. It should beremembered that
this time Z is the number of cases when noneof the series shows a
zero change. This does not hamperthe comparison as a look at
the respective Z's will show. The presentprocedure was simply more
rigorous.
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Pcksofcowsfries N2 p CingtoC
Rank
accord-
January 1878-July 1914,439 months
Great Britain-France 3201880.001 <p <0.01
Great Britain-Gennany 301108 p <0.001







January 1925-December 1931,84 months
Great Britain-France 35220.1<p <0.2 0.258 3
Great Britain-Germany 43250.8<p < 0.5 0.162 4
France-Germany 40190.7 <p < 0.8 0.050 5
Great Britain-United States45300.04 <p <0.05 0.334 1-2
United States-Germany 49160.02 <p < 0.03 6
United States-France 42280,04 <p <0.05 0.334 1-2CENTRAL BANK DiSCOUNT RATES
Sunniarq.Whatever influence central banks may actuallyhave
exercised or may have wished to exerciseupon exchange rates,a
comparison of the bank rate differentials with theexchanges dis..
closes no intimate relationship. In thisrespect the results are signifi.
cantly different from those obtained froma study of differentials
of open market rates and exchangerates. There even a new "shorr
cycle emerged; here onlyvery wide swings occurred in the differ.
entials. Apparently the othermeans of policy, besides the discount
rate, must be considered. But this is impossibleto do except in a very
rough manner because of the lack ofinformation, which cannever
be made good. It is however likelythat through a complexset of
measures the banks have, from time to time, exercisedsuch influence.
Even then it is doubtful whetherit was continuous and broughtcen-
tral banking policy andvariations of the exchange rates inas close
a contact as that between discount rates and theopen market rates,
which was itself not quiteas intimate as might have been expected.
But the central banks haveinfluenced, in their complexways, the
domestic money supply andperhaps even its velocity, althoughthey
had only partial controlover both. Variations in money supplyin-
fluenced the domestic interestrates in the same direction and often
the relative rates too. In thelatter case desired capitalmovements
would ensue with the correspondingvariation of the exchanges. The
possible combinationsare very numerous; many of themare those
generally mentioned in theliterature, and it would certainlybe desirable if one could reallyanalyze them all together.
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Bank of England. The bank is free to purchase (bankers'
acceptances)1at rates above those officially announced, which thus
is a minimum rate. Hence a lowering of the rate may lag considerably
behind the effective decrease of the actually charged rateswhich
were often several different ones simultaneously, as is typical with
monopolies. Similarly there were hidden increases in the effective
rate while the official rate remained constant.
Bank of France. The official rate is, as far as is known, the
one at which actual purchases are made. These are restricted to
prime bills with three signatures. This is an unusually restrictive
device, since only a small (but unknown) percentage of all bills
carries three. Hence there was in France only a small number out of
the total number of bills eligible for discount or rediscount at the
centralbank.2This may in part have been one of the contributing
factors to the notorious stability of the French discount rate; prices
are frequently stable when there is no certainty. TheBritish and
more specifically the German practices were greatly admired by some
French economists as late as 1905 and advocated for the Bank of
France.3But the real test lies in the investigation of the difference
between the official and the market rates of discount. If this differ-
ence is as a rule large, then the temptation andpossibility to use
differentiating, multiple rates was greater (cf. Table 85 for the actual
differences). We see thus that the French practice was quite differ-
ent from the British and to a still greater extent and in adifferent
1"Jnong ordinaiy bills of exchange ... the Bank(of England) will only
countenance bills bearing at least two good British signatures, oneof which
must be that of a British bank (in which case the bill iscalled a 'Bank Bill')
orthatofaleadingmerchanthou5e(inWh1C1ethebil1ll finetrade
bill'). The fact that a discount house can go to the Bank ofEngland m the
last resort only with bills of exchange whicT fali into these twoclasses (and,
of course, Treasury Bills) makes the discount marketprefer these two classes"
(R. S. Sayers,ModernBanking, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 52). Cf. also
Sayers' valuable paper, "The Development of CentralBanking after Bagehot,
Economic Histoi'y Review, VoL iv, 1951, pp. 109-116.
20n the other hand the direct accessibility of theBank of France for busi-
ness led to its discounting of billsfor as small amounts as five francs! See
below, footnotes 5, 1, and 18.
'M. Patron, 'Ihe Bank of France in itsRelation to National and Interna-
tional Credit," SenateDocument No.494, 1910, p. 38, footnote a.
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direction also from the German. On the other hand theextenjjv
use of the gold premium policy complicates the situation inanother
direction.
(c) Reich.sbank. The official rate may be consideredthe effective
rate with knowa exceptions. Thesewere due to the use by the
Reichsbank of the so-called "private discountrate".not to becon..
fused with the open market discountrate which bears thesame
name. In order to distinguish the twowe shall write "private" when
the private rate of the Reichsbankis referred to. The official Relcbs.
bank rate wasa maximum rate, i.e., the "private" ratewas always
lower. The "private" rate could beapplied, according to thestatute of the bank, only when themoney market was "very liquid,"i.e.,
the official rate under 4per cent. The behavior of these rateswill
be discussed below inAppendix B of this chapter, after thisdescrip-
tion of the nature of the data. Theofficial Reichsbank ratewas repre-
sentative for a very large volume ofbusiness transactions; in1907, for example, itwas estimated that two-fifths of all the billsoutstand.. lug in Cermanywere held by the Reichsbank.This is probably
similar to conditionsat the Bank of France. Bothwere in direct con- tact with industry andcommerce without using anyintermediaxy at all, whether banks, bankers,or bill brokers. In this practice they
differed profoundly fromthe Bank of England, whichonly in the 1930's of this century beganto change the nature of Itsoperations.1 The averageper bill of bills discounted disclosesthis. In France, for example, 30 to 48per cent of all bills discountedwere for amounts of 5 to 10 francs only.7In Germany about 30per cent of bills dis- counted were below 200marks, and only 3per cent over 10000 marks.
(d) Federal ReserveBatik of New York. Thesituation here Is In
The exceptions could beascertained In 1912, butnot with during the period whenthey actually occurred,which Is an Interesting While they were made therewere reports that thehappeued,but apparently there was nocontinuous, quantitative knowledge.ritinga on discount sInce 1912 scem to haveneglected the point, althoughIt Is of great Interest of Importance for thestatisticalnation of the earlier data. 'If. Schuhmacher, "DieDeutsche Celdverfsssuiigund Ihre Reform," In Schmoljg?, Jahrbücher,VoL 32, 1908,reprinted In Wdtwirt,d4,f$jSiudIsis, 1911, p. 9. ThIs estimatewould Indicate* total of 2,760 mIllion marks bi outstanding in the yearlyaverage for 1907; thiswas a year of great strain. 'For example, througnits subSldlaiy, theIndustrial DeveIopmen Company. But this had nothing to dowith the ordinary discountmarket. TPatron, op. cit.,pp. 84-85. It is difficult tosee how they could have dma. signaturest
'Die Relchsba,ak1876-1910, bc. cit.,p. 153.
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many ways more complicated than the discussion can convey at
this juncture. On the other hand good descriptions of the involved
technical and highly formalistic regulations exist,9 as well as attempts
to discover and describe the policy of the bank. The chief complica-
tion from the international viewpoint lies first in the fact, already
mentioned, that this bank does not set a unique rate for the whole
country, but gives us only one out of twelve. So there is here still
another loss of uniqueness! Second, there is no complete autonomy
of the bank regarding changes of the rate, formally (perhaps per-
functorily) dependent upon the approval of the Federal Reserve
Board. But the latter factor is not important even if the board should
completely determine the discount rate, since it would still be what
it is. An average of the various discount rates of the twelve Federal
Reserve banks was not considered, because of the overwhelming
importance of the New York market.
Detailed regulations, several times amended, cover the eligibility
of paper for discount. Originally, "commercial paper arising out of
transactions related to an agricultural, industrial or commercial
purpose" was to be admitted for discount. But the decline in eligible
paper in the United States forced some revisions that provided for
admission of longer-term paper. Also the Federal Reserve banks were
more willing than before to take noneigible paper, though atdiffer-
Cf., for example: "Under the original act, a Federal Reserve bank could
rediscount only 'eligible' paper which met specific conditions as laid down in
the [Federal Reserve] Act and interpreted by the Board in its Regulation A
and rulings. The interpretations, it may be added, tended to be more liberal
than consistent. Among the specific conditions for eligibility of paper is the
requirement that it be negotiable. At time of discount by the ReserveBank, the
maturity of the paper must not exceed 90 days, excluding days of grace. How-
ever, paper drawn or issued for an agricultural purpose orbased on livestock
may have a maturity of 9 months (prior to 1923, 6months). Sight bills of
exhange drawn to finance shipment of non-perishable, readilymarketable
staple agricultural products, and secured by docnments of title coveringthem,
have been admitted since 1923, but may not be held by a Reservebank for
more than 90 days."
Other important conditions include the proviso that paper must arise outof
actual commercial transactions, drawn (and "have beenused or are to be
used") for agricultural or commercial purposes, orboth. Permanent and fixed
investments are ruled out (W. H. Steiner and E.Shapiro, Money and Banking,
rev. ed., New York, 1941, pp.587-588).
at present a Reserve Bank may make anadvance to a member bank on
its note secured by any collateral satisfactory tothe Reserve Bank. In case the
collateral is not of the kind described as eligible,however, the Reserve Bank
must charge an extra ½ per cent or moreof interest." (The Federal Reserve
System, 2nd ed., Washington, 1947, p. 25.)
On the entire eligibility problem, ci. S. E.Harris, Twenty Years of Federal
Reserve loUcy, Harvard University Press,1933, Part w.
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ent rates than that here considered. The decline of eligible paper
is best shown in the percentage of total loans and investments. For
the entire Federal Reserve System the percentage fell from 24.5on
June 80, 1920 to 7.2 on June 30, 1935; during the same periodgovern.
ment securities bought increased more than fivefold.'0 These de.
velopments tend to reflect on the validity of a continuousstatisticaJ
use of the discount rate. However this is of minor importance for
us, since the New York rate only is included during the shortpostwar
period, which as a whole has been givensomewhat inferior role
in this work for reasons explained elsewhere.
10Cf. W. R. Burgess, op. cit.,p. 48. The reasons for the gradual decline of
commercialpaper in theUnited Statesarediscussed ther too. Further material
is found in Neil H. Jacoby and B. J. Saunier,Business i'lnance and Banking,
Natiianal Bureau of Economic Research, 1947.APPENDIX B
DISCRIMINATORY DISCOUNT RATES
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Among the two most important parameters of central bank policy
are the discriminatory discount rates and prices for gold. The first
arises from the high degree of monopoly power of a central bank;
it is likely, as elsewhere, to produce discrimination. Moreover the
British and German discount rates are even defined as minimum
and maximum rates respectively so that other rates than these must
be expected. The second also derives from a quasimonopoly situa-
tion. While it would be desirable to discuss the gold policy here,
the treatment originally given has been omitted for want of space.
The meaning of the subsequent discussion is illustrated by re-
calling Table 82. There it is seen that the "private" discount rates
are essentially internal measures, while manipulations of the price
of gold are externally conditioned. The rate of discount itself was
found to be exposed to both kinds of forces and thus formed a
class by itself. The discriminatory rates are British and German
institutions, the gold premium is French, but manipulation of gold
prices also occurs in London, as will be shown in detail on some
other occasion. There are no such records for Germany; there are
onlyas elsewhere, e.g., in Londondenials of the existence of
the practice. All observations refer to the period before 1914. After
World War I these manipulations seem to have ceased. The reason
is beyond doubt the greater use of other more effective instruments
and qualitative credit controls, finally topped by all devices of ex-
change control after the abandonment of the gold standard. These
tendencies began to develop even before 1914, and the petering
Out of some of the measures in 1896 for Germany and about 1900
for France may have been due to the same developments.
In previous sections, notably in 6 and 7, it became clear that
the study of the discount rates alone did not reveal nearly as
much as the existing literature would have suggested. in particular
it was hard to form any precise ideas as to the transmissionof crises
or cycles, although some descriptivematerial was found useful. Now
we shall examine two of these rates inthe light of the discrimina-
tion which they imply. The term discrimination is tobe taken in
the traditional economic sense: different prices are chargedsimul-
taneously to different customers for essentially the same corn-CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNTRATES
modityin this case accommodation at thecentral bank.It always associated with a strong element ofmonopoly whichin th present case is certainly prevalent. However itwould beineor to assume that the central banks had anythinglike a
complete monopoly in these four countries. They didnot everywhereeno. even a legal monopoly for note issue; andas long asany inter- national borrowing was possible theywere only to a limjtJ
lenders of the last resort."
The German rate is a maximum,the Britisha minjmumszrate, so that without a study of the deviationsin therespective directio all statements about the publishedrates alone are
incomplete, In spite of this and of theenormous volume of thetransactio . volved, as will beseen at least in the Germancase where theonh material is available, oddlyenough, very littleattention has bee given to discrimination inthe literatureor in statisticalinvestiga tions.
Our previous studiesin this chapterwere always madewith this limitation in mind. Thereis of coursea genuine interestand an undeniable possibility in theinvestigation of cqclicalbehavior when (a) the amplitudesdo not matter(except in theirinfluencupon the determinationof the cycle, dependingon the latter's definition) and (b) the inclusionof discriminatoryrates do not changethe length of theindividual cycles.Our study ofdifferentiah into which the officialrates enter is ofcourse affected. Whenand to what extentcan be seen from thepresent section. Since the Germandata are by farthe mostcomplete,'3 we begin with thiscase. The Reichsbank,during theyears 1880-18%,ex- cepting 1891 andoccasional months inotheryears (cf. Table 1 and Chart 52),acquired bills of thesame nature as thosealwa bought ata rate below theofficial. Thestatute empowered thebank to do so undera few restrictive
conditions.'4 When theybecame "This is completelydifferent whena full exchange controlprevails. Thea differential, i.e.,monopolistic discountrates are not ncarl1as important as other instrumentsof dfrectcontrol, mostlyinvolving the poiice,and also of a highly discriminatoiynature. The secrecysurroundmg somany central bunkoperations is a typical by' product of theexistence of monopolyelements. 3See, however,p. 429. 13Thi neednot mean thatdiscriminatobuying of hillswas less importaist in London. The
notorious secretivenessofe Bank of England and thelack of inquisitivefl,5 ofearlier Britisheconomists in thisrespect iiiake it impossible to settle this Issuesatisfactorily. "The chiefone being thata (lower) privateruite could be used only wh the othcialdiscou0, rate didnot exceed 4per cent.
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TABLE 106
Private Discount Bate of the Reichsbank,1880-1896
(nmnthl!, data)
Source: Die Reichthank 1878 bis 1910, 1912, p. 202-205, monthly averages
computed from daily quotations. These averages are weighted by the number
of private quotations given in each month.
No definite private rates.
bNo private rates and no transactions.
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1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885
January 2.87 3.50 3.29 3.34
February 2.89 3.27 3.00 3.00
March 2.59 3.55 3.00 8.11 3.00
April 3.01 2.90 3.66 3.03 3.27
May 3.05 8.26 3.42 3.00 3.06 3.29
June 3.09 8.24 3.55 3.40 8.19 3.20
July 2.92 3.67 3.75 3.38 3.05 3.02
August 3.65 8.88 8.75 3.25 3.00 8.00
September 4.74 3.87 8.42 8.22 8.12
October b a a 3.50 3.06
November 3.67 3.85 3.00
December
b b b 368 3.76 3.27
1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891
January 2.86 3.49 2.08 2.53
B
February 2.16 3.28 2.00 2.07 3.82
March 2.12 2.62 2.19 2.12 3.87 a
April 2.13 2.50 2.03 2.08 a a
May 2.00 2.36 2.00 2.00
B a
June 2.37 2.55 2.12 2.45
B
July 2.04 2.06 2.02 2.07 3.58
August 2.02 2.00 2.04 2.41 3.38
September 2.15 2.48 2.19 3.34 3.42
B
October 2.93 2.45 3.62 4.00 b B
November 3.02 2.51 3.40 a a a
December 3.74 2.69 3.69
b a a
1892 1893 1894 1895 1898
January 2.00 2.41 2.78 2.00
B
Febniary 2.04 2.00 2.04 2.00 2.60
March 2.00 2.04 2.17 2.05 2.33
April 2.00 2.18 2.02 2.00 2.50
May 2.00 3.12 2.01 2.00
June 2.19 3.30 2.00 2.28




B 2.08 2.35 a
October 2.52
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Purchase of Bills below the Official Discount Rate at the
Private Rate of the Reichsbank, 1880_1896a
(yearly data)
Source: Die Rewhsbank, 1912, pp. 132-133.
'During the years 1878 through 1879, 1891,and 1897 through 1914, bills
were not purchased belowthe official discount rate. The average maturityof the
bills bought was 78 days, the range 74 to 78days.
operative the bank stopped buying;this happened in 1881-1882,
1885, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1893, and1895, often only for a few months;
then the official rate had always risenbeyond 4 per cent, frequently
beyond 4.5 per cent.
Chart 52 shows the data ofTable 106 together with theofficial
and the Berlin open marketdiscount rates for the relevantperiod.
In order to evaluate the"private" rate, it is necessary to knowthe
volume of the transactionswhich it governed. The Reicbsbank
furnishes even this essentialinformation, although only on a
yearly basis. It is reproducedin Table 107. This statesthe total





BH.LS BOUGff Earnings from bills
belw the official
as per cent of earn-







1880 338 61 18.02 12.64
1881 338 58 17.04 13.39
1882 381 55 14.90 12.14
1883 302 125 34.46 29.45
1884 373 140 37.55 33.05
1885 385 127 34.76 28.39
1886 380 173 45.48 40.05
1887 438 228 52.33 42.05
1888 428 207 48.39 42.81
1889 507 213 42.03 31.20
1890 529 62 11.79 9.54
1891
1892 537 228 42,36 33.84
1893 578 161 27.89 19.66
1894 545 269 49.40 36.13
1895 571 204 35.72 28.12
1896 644 68 10.58 7.59CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATES
the earnings from the bills bought at the "private" rate isex-
pressed as a percentage of the total profit realized from all domestic
bills.It is also noteworthy that the average maturity of these
preferentially treated bills was seventy-six days, another indication
that the Reichsbank was acting as a competitor with the private
banks where this was the average maturity of bills held. In Eng
land on the other band, where the official rate was a minimumrate,
higher discriminatory rates were accompanied or preceded (since
the two need not coincide) by a shortening of the general maturity
level of the bills discounted.'5
The interpretation of Chart 52 is simple. We only mention these
points: the "private rate shows an almost perfect one-to..onecor-
respondence of movement with the open market rate. It is inmost
instances higher than the latter, often only by a minute fraction
of one per cent, sometimes more than 05 per cent. Thetimes of
greatest stringency are those when it was not applied at all and
when sharp risesoften up to 2 per cent in two to three months
occurred, If the "real" Reichsbank rate were computedwithap-
propriate weights, talen from Table 107from the official and the
private it would not only be lower but also showvery few, if any,
zero changes. Our differentials would be influenced accordingly."
It is impossible to say whether the movements of theprivate rate
were affected by external reasons too, but it is clear that they had
their effects upon the international position of theReichsbank
like any other instruments of policy. One mightexpect that the
'private" rate would riseor fall (sizably) before either the official
or the open market rate. There aremany instances where the
private and the open market rate moved beforethe official rate.
(Cf. also the discussion of Table96.) The Hpr1vateP rate was
probably operated rather automatically, thebank endeavoring only
to keep a more or less constant differencewith the open market
rate. Somewhat more discernmentwas apparently used in the
amount of bills bought as Table 107 shows. Fromall this It is
clear that the cycles of the "privaterate coincide well with those
of the open market rate,especially if the discoutinuities of the
former are neglectedor, rather, intvqeted as especially sharp
"In France It was a frequent practice thatIn Umes of stringency the bank would take only long-termpaper at the then existing high rates In order to
dinx*irage bonuwing beyond the h.ediiginfluence of an Increased r Of
to ad Its sue. This goes to ihew that thereIs a great deal ii frsedto the
consbinatio,, of the varlois Inatiument,.
"The weights are only avallahieon a yeasty bash.DISCRIMiNATORY DISCOUNT RATES
peaks. These would then be those of the official ratea permissible
interpretation no doubt.17
The volume of the transactions ranged from 10 to over 50 per
cent of the total of all bills bought, and up to 42.8 per cent of all
earnings from discounts were due to that part of the business of
the Reichsbañk. It is clear that in view of these magnitudes the
study of the official rates must remain inconclusive. On the other
hand the cyclical behavior will be found to coincide almost com-
pletely with that of the open market rates and their derivatives.
The absolute level is of course a different one, but it disappears in
these comparisons at any rate. We stress the significance of this
"private" rate so much because it is a classical example of how
vague the descriptions of central banking policy are when they
rely exclusivelyas most of them doon the ("accurate") statistics
of the official rate. It is difficult to say how many further instances
of the same kind would be found elsewhere in economies, but the
chances are high that they are numerous. One of the additional
fields is given by the devious practices of central banks regarding
the price of gold.
There is no evidence that the Reichsbank at the same time
manipulated the price of goldfor sale or purchasebeyond what
was already stated on p.433. This reference is indicated here be-
cause the data on the Bankof England intermingle both, and for
the Bank of France we have the gold premium policy.
Table 108 comprises all available informationabout the rate.s
charged by the Bank of England in excessofits official minimum
rate.'8 It contains only eleven entries,spread from 1890 to 1910. In
Germany we had 16 years, or atotal of 192 months (allowing for
all discontinuities). It is very doubtfulthat there should not have
been more instances in London,but it has not been possible to
obtain further information, eitherof additional cases or of the
duration of the rates above the minimum,etc. The dates are inter-
esting: 1890 was the timeof the Baring crisis, occurring after a
business cycle peak; 1893 was a yearof great crisis, shown in the
reference cycle of the United Statesonly, but in fact gripping all
countries then movingdownhill; 1899 is immediatelybefore a
British peak; 1901 falls into abrief expansion; the dates of 1906
It is not necessary therefore torepeat our measures of covariation. Because
of the almost perfect one-to-onecorrespondence, the same results would obtain
as if the openmarket rate itself were taken.
UNo data are availableabout the volume of business, orabout the rates
below the "minimum" rateand the size of that business.
4390
Source: Economist.
Cold Prices Charged or Paid by the Bankof England Beyond Its
Statutory Buying Price
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TABLE 108




Feb. 1890 Buying rate raised to:77s., 9½d.
May, June 1891 77s., 9½d.
Nov. 1892 Selling rate raised to:78s., Id.
Aug. 1396 Selling rate: 77s., lid.
Sept. 1896Selling rate: 78s.
Oct. 1897 Selling rate: 78s., 1/d. Apr. 1898 Buying rate: 77s., 9%d. Oct. 1898 Selling rate: 7&.,
Apr. 1899 Buying rate: T7s., 9%d. (possibly higher) Feb.May 1903 77s., 914d. Oct.Dee. 1903 77s., 10½d. Mar. 1904 77s., 9½d. June 1904 77s., 9%d. July 1904 77s., 9d. Fall 1909 77s., 914d. to 77s., lOd. Feb. 1906 77s., 9½d. Sept. 1906 78s., Id. Jan.Sept. 1907
77s., 9'4d. to 77s., 104d. Jan. 1908 77s., 9d. to 77s., 9d. Apr. 1908 77s., 9%d. Mar. 1910 77s 914JI,.
Source: B. S. Sayers, Bankof England Operation. Limitsare set by: obligation to issue notes in exchangefor gold at 77s., 9d.(buying rate); obligation to pay sovereigns in exchange fornotes at par, 77s., l0%d. (sellingrate). The above listing is illustrativeand does not include alldates when prices exceeded these limits; therewere in fact many others.
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Sept. 1890 5 5½
Nov. 1890 0 63, 7+
May 1891 3½ 4
Aug. 1893 4 4
Sept. 1899 3 3%-4
Nov. 1899 5 6
June 1901 3 4
Sept.Oct. 1906 4 4½
Aug. 1907 4 4½ Oct 1907 4½ 5-8
Oct. 1910 3 4DISCRIMiNATORY DISCOUNT RATES
and 1907 relate no doubt to the latter year's crisis. October 1910
however is at the beginning of a long expansion. So we see, the
dates shown in Table 108 are not unreasonable; but on the other
hand the fact that they are related both to beginnings and ends
of expansions makes it highly doubtful that these should have
been the only instances.
In particular it is known that the Bank of England chargedhigher
rates of discount for bills of arbitrageurs inorder to punish them
for their export operations. It is conjectured that this practice was
discontinued because of public opposition?9 However it comple-
ments the habit of either charging no interest oronly a nominal
interest rate to those who borrowed inorder to import gold. As we
know this was a standard practice of most centralbanks.
How much discounting was done at thehigher "actual" rates is
not known. But, as said before,the application of a higher rate
(whether actual or not) often coincidedwith enforcing shorter
maturity on bills so as to increase therisk that later discounts might
only be possible at still higher (minimum oractual) rates, if at all.
Table 108 also contains the gold pricescharged or paid by the
Bank of England beyond its statutorybuying price. We note here
that the number of recordeddiscriminatory gold prices exceeds by
not less than four timesthose for the "actual" discount rate.It is
of course possible that thebank found it more convenientand
speedy to change buying andselling prices of specified typesof
gold than "actual" discount rates;but we found no documentary
evidence to support such a view.
The endeavor to attract or atleast to hold gold by meansother
than the discount rate was commonto all central banks, no matter
how often denied. In Germanyit was notorious thatloans free of
charge were made to importersof specie and directobstacles were
placed in the path ofwould-be exporters of specie. InFrance the
gold premium policyserved, rather successfully,the same pur-
pose. All thicshould be discussed in thegeneral framework of the
gold problem as such, viz.,when an effort is made todiscover to
what extent the flowsof gold conformed toexchange rates and
interest ratedifferentials, and, as vehiclesof capital transfers, also
transmitted business cycles.
1 Cf. Landesberger, op. cit., p. 25.
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